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25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the DCI
for Compartmentation

25X1 VIA: [REDACTED]
Director, Information Resources Office

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]
Information Resources Office

SUBJECT: Comments on Requests for Excess 4C Funds

REFERENCES: A. Discussion of Requests for Excess 4C
Funds, SA/DCI/C, dtd 23 May 1980
B. DCI Funds for the APEX Implementation,
D/DODIIS Engineering, dtd 18 March 1980

1. The analysis and prioritization presented in Reference A is reasonable and appropriate at this time. Because of the heterogeneous nature of the DIA organizations and computer systems they represent, I agree that funds remaining after possible travel and indoctrination aid expenses should be considered for allocation to a DIA study effort. I do not agree with the nature of the study as proposed in Reference B. It is my impression that the DIA proposed study addresses a problem which may or may not exist several years from now. It would seem more appropriate for DIA to address near term (FY 81-FY 83) ADP-T modifications required to adjust to potential changes in electrical message formats resulting from APEX implementation.

2. Before discussing the DIA proposal in detail, some general observations are appropriate. With respect to APEX and ADP-T, I would submit, there are three basic variables--number of APEX billets, DCID 1/16, and resources (assuming the level of ADP support is at least constant). That is, changes in any one of these three factors should affect the other two. If the number of billets are arbitrarily reduced either DCID 1/16 must be changed or money spent to implement compartmented mode processing or partially redundant additional ADP support. It appears that the DIA proposal assumes that billets of ADP users will be reduced and that DCID 1/16 will not be modified to adjust the APEX environment.

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3. With respect to billets, I feel there cannot and will not be a great reduction of accesses granted to current ADP users. The fact that all COMINT product remains in APEX and that there will be no data base retrofit supports this argument. After the decompartmentation of IMAGERY and ELINT, ADP users requiring only access to collateral current data will have to have APEX clearance to access old TK data for several years. In addition, I would submit, that the majority of the computer systems listed in Reference B are presently operating in an SCI system high mode* (SI/TK, TK, or SI). I suggest this assumption be verified by tasking DIA to supply the following information for each computer listed in Reference B:

Indicate Mode** - Dedicated, System High, Compartmented or mix time periods

Indicate Security - Unclassified, Collateral, SI/TK, SI, TK, etc.

Indicate Connection - IDHSCI, IDHSCII, COINS, AUTODIN, etc. to Networks

4. It may be appropriate to modify DCID 1/16 to adjust to an APEX environment. Since an objective of APEX is to clarify the distinction between Operational compartments and Product compartments, it might be appropriate to address this in the context of DCID 1/16. That is, should the rules be more rigorous for separating Operational compartments' data from each other and Product, than the separation of Product access? Specifically, DCID 1/16 defines compartmented mode as a "system processing two or more types of SCI, or any one type of SCI with other than SCI." Mixing both SCI and non SCI users on the same system may not be feasible and would be expensive. But, as noted in paragraph 3, this may not be as significant a problem as Reference B indicates. It seems to me a basic issue for DIA and the Community is the interpretation (or modification) of DCID 1/16 with respect to Product compartments. That is, for example, if a computer system contains both IMAGERY and COMINT APEX product, everyone using the computer must have approved access to those compartments (System High Mode) whether they need it or not. Operating in a compartmented mode implies that some users require only COMINT or IMAGERY and under current DCID 1/16 the computer system must have extensive physical security capabilities. These capabilities are certainly warranted if one wishes to

*DCID 1/16 (6 June 78), Computer Security Regulation, Sec. II.2.b, p. 4.
**IBID, Sec. II.2.a, II.2.b, II.2.c.

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mix SCI with non SCI users or, possibly, mixing operational and product data, but the if the DCID 1/16 physical security rules were relaxed somewhat a reduction in access billets might be achievable at a minimum cost. Given the above example, everyone using the computer would be cleared for APEX, some with COMINT/IMAGERY access, and some with COMINT only or IMAGERY only access. The computer system and data bases need only to restrict access to data enforcing the need-to-know principle but not meeting all of the security requirements of DCID 1/16. In other words, we should have less concern about an accidental data spillage between Product compartments than between APEX Products, APEX Operational, and non SCI computer users.

5. When APEX is implemented what cannot be done, will not be done. No one should be turned away from their ADP support because of APEX. In the short run, it may be necessary to grant APEX clearance just so someone gets his present ADP support. Until we know more about what will be in or out of the TECHNICAL and IMAGERY compartments and experience this new environment, we should not aggressively pursue compartmented mode ADP operations. These proposals should be addressed in conjunction with resources and billet reductions. In the meantime, DCID 1/16 should be re-examined with respect to APEX. For the near term, DIA should be concerned with their existing ADP-T systems and changes required to generate, receive, and process changes in message formats. The scope and nature of this problem should be investigated to ensure that the DODIIS transition to APEX is orderly and can be executed within three to five years.



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